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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY CRISIS OR
PATIENT COMPENSATION CRISIS?
Kathryn Zeiler*
INTRODUCTION
Tort reform has been a hot topic among those interested in assess-
ing whether and how well the tort system aids injured plaintiffs' ability
to achieve civil justice. The debate has been especially heated when it
comes to medical malpractice liability. Proponents of malpractice lia-
bility reforms-reforms such as damages caps and shifts from joint
and several liability to proportionate liability-argue that the broken
and out-of-control liability system is error-prone and produces too
many jumbo verdicts.' According to this argument, the huge and
highly variable awards cause medical malpractice insurers to increase
premiums, which leads to an increase in the cost of healthcare, an in-
crease in the number of uninsured, and a decrease in the number of
physicians who are willing to practice in jurisdictions that are some-
times labeled as "judicial hellholes. ''2
Tort reform opponents, on the other hand, tend to argue that limita-
tions on recovery or access to the tort system violate constitutional
rights and that some reforms do more harm than good. For example,
they claim that damages caps make it difficult for a subset of negli-
gently injured plaintiffs to find a lawyer who is willing to pursue a
legal claim on a contingency fee basis. Opponents also argue that the
liability system is not the cause of insurance premium spikes;3 thus,
reforms should not be expected to stabilize premiums, at least in the
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; zeiler@law.georgetown.edu;
www.georgetown.edu/facultyfkmz3/. Special thanks to Leslie Street, Georgetown University
Law Center Reference Librarian and research companion; Juliette Forstenzer, LLM 2009, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center; Kristen Gorzelany, J.D. Candidate 2012, Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center; and David Thornton, J.D. Candidate 2011, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See discussion infra Part II.
2. See infra notes 21-27, 45, 72-73, 82 and accompanying text; William Lamb, Pro-Lawsuit
Group Wants President's Ear, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 2005 (characterizing Madison
and St. Clair counties, in Illinois, as "judicial hellholes").
3. See discussion infra Part II.
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long run.4 Some opponents further argue that the unreformed tort
system does not do enough to compensate negligently injured
patients.5
Until recently, rhetoric about the liability system and its relation-
ship to both insurance markets and provider supply dominated tort
reform debates. While claims made by both proponents and oppo-
nents may seem intuitive, they are often unsubstantiated. In recent
years, however, academics and others have acquired or created
datasets to perform analyses with the purpose of enhancing our un-
derstanding of the relationship between the tort system and medical
malpractice insurance markets. These studies have helped to shift tort
reform debates away from rhetoric and toward inferences drawn from
facts that are reported in empirical studies.
While empirical research has been useful in shifting policy debates
from rhetoric to reality, not all aspects of the tort reform debate have
been empirically addressable. Most notably, although the vast major-
ity of medical malpractice cases are resolved through private settle-
ments between medical malpractice insurers, providers, and patients,
researchers have been historically unable to observe settlement out-
comes. 6 This limitation has, in turn, limited our ability to observe
both the impact of the liability stystem on important outcomes and the
impact on the liability system of changes to the legal rules. Recently
discovered datasets collected by state insurance departments, how-
ever, have provided a window into settlement outcomes, allowing us
to examine important connections between liability systems and insur-
ance markets.7 Using these datasets we have been able to track, for
the first time in some cases, comprehensive trends in the number of
claims and the size of payouts over time; potential impacts of tort re-
4. We might expect short-term decreases in premiums if insurers expect reduced losses. If
reforms do not in fact reduce losses, however, insurers are forced to increase prices to compen-
sate for short-term underpricing.
5. See David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Malpractice, 350
NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 285 (2004) ("Only 2 percent of negligent injuries resulted in claims
.... .); accord Patricia Born, W. Kip Viscusi & Tom Baker, The Effects of Tort Reform on
Medical Malpractice Insurers' Ultimate Losses, 76 J. RISK & INS. 197, 198 (2009).
6. See VASANTHAKUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 32 (2001); Patricia Munch
Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 347 (1983); Stephen J. Spurr & Walter O. Simmons, Medical
Malpractice in Michigan: An Economic Analysis, 21 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & LAW 315, 323 n.16
(1996).
7. See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in
Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 209 (2005) (describing Texas's closed claims
medical malpractice dataset); Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical
Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 318 (2005) (describing
Florida's closed medical malpractice dataset).
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form on recoveries; connections between policy limits and payouts;
trends in purchases of coverage over time; and trends in defense
costs.
8
The Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) was one of the first state
insurance departments to collect and make publicly available claims-
level data on closed medical malpractice claims.9 TDI began collect-
ing and reporting data on closed claims in the late 1980s, following a
sharp rise in medical malpractice insurance premiums.' 0 When a
Texas insurer closes a medical malpractice claim, it is required to re-
port certain information about payments, patient characteristics, liti-
gation outcomes, timing of litigation procedures and outcomes,
location where the injury occurred, jurisdiction of the lawsuit, and
characteristics of other defendants and payments made by each."1
During the period from 1988 to 2005, Texas insurers filed roughly
16,000 reports related to closed medical malpractice claims.1 2
8. See Black et al., supra note 7; David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What Juries
Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 3, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Hyman et al., Defendants Pay]; David A. Hyman et al.,
Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 355, 355 (2009) [hereinafter Hyman et al., Evidence from Texas]; Kathryn
Zeiler et al., Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas
Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S9, S9 (2007).
9. See TEX. DEP'T OF INS., 1997 TEXAS LIABILITY INSURANCE CLOSED CLAIM ANNUAL RE-
PORT (1997), available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/report4.html (last visited July 13,
2009).
10. See Black et al., supra note 7, at 208, 215 (describing the data collected by the Texas
Department of Insurance (TDI)). The description of the data in the text is attributed to Black et
al. unless otherwise indicated. A "claim" in this context is a request by an insured provider for
indemnification for an incurred or expected loss from an insured peril. See TEX. DEP'T oF INS.,
TEXAS CLOSED CLAIM REPORTING GUIDE (2004) [hereinafter REPORTING GUIDE] (on file with
author). Claims filed by the insured are not always accompanied by the filing of a lawsuit. A
claim is considered closed when the insurer has made all indemnity and expense payments on
the claim. See id. TDI has audited the data for completeness and accuracy (but for only some
variables) since 1990. Black et al. exclude 1988-1989 when reporting number of claims due to
potential incompleteness. See Black et al., supra note 7, at 215.
11. See REPORTING GUIDE, supra note 10. TDI does some work to audit reports. See Black
et al., supra note 7, at 215.
12. See Hyman et al., Evidence from Texas, supra note 8, at 364. The data TDI collects vary
according to the size of the total known payment to the claimant by all defendants. For claims
with payments less than $24,999, insurers are not required to report the cause of the injury;
therefore, separating medical malpractice claims from other types of claims is impossible. For
this reason, most results are produced using only "large" claims-those with total payments of at
least $25,000. In addition, TDI does not adjust the reporting threshold from year to year. There-
fore, the number of claims reported as large claims will increase over time due in part to infla-
tion. To control for this, we exclude claims with payouts measured in 1988 dollars that fall
between $25,000 (nominal) and $25,000 (1988 dollars). For example, we excluded all claims
closed in 1989 with payouts between $25,000 and $26,205 (buying power of $25,000 in 1988
dollars).
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Datasets like the one TDI generates and distributes allow us to bet-
ter assess the liability system's ability to deliver just outcomes. They
also allow us to verify or challenge claims made by proponents and
opponents of tort reform, assess the impacts of tort reform on impor-
tant outcomes, and better understand the relationship between the lia-
bility system and insurance markets. Instead of supporting claims
made by those who blame medical malpractice liability system crises
for rising insurance premiums, results using closed claims data, when
taken as a whole, suggest that we might instead be facing a patient
compensation crisis.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II summarizes the com-
mon rhetoric in tort reform debates that places the blame for rising
premiums on the liability system and touts tort reform as the cure-all
for ailing insurance markets. 13 It then summarizes empirical results,
produced using Texas closed claims data and other data, which suggest
not only that Texas tort reform advocates wrongly placed blame on
the liability system, but also that noneconomic damages caps passed in
2003 have caused more harm than good. 14 Part III describes results
that suggest that the widely used tactic of pointing to jumbo jury ver-
dicts to justify tort reform is misguided.15 While verdicts and payouts
are positively correlated, patients and their lawyers, on average, re-
cover only fifty-six cents of each dollar awarded.' 6 In addition, the
larger the verdict, the lower the fraction paid.17 While judicial over-
sight and damages caps explain about a third of the difference be-
tween verdicts and payouts, the largest chunk of the difference is
explained by the fact that patients rarely recover more than the pro-
vider's insurance policy limits. This finding is cause for concern, espe-
cially given the fact that coverage purchased by Texas physicians is
lower than conventional wisdom would predict and is continually on
the decline.' 8 The data paint a picture not of a liability system in cri-
sis, but of a patient compensation crisis, one that might severely limit
the ability of the liability system to deliver civil justice to negligently
injured patients.
13. See infra notes 19-44 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 72-127 and accompanying text.
16. See Hyman et al., Defendants Pay, supra note 8, at 4.
17. Id.
18. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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II. THE TORT REFORM DEBATE
In 1999, Texas medical malpractice insurers started to sharply in-
crease insurance premiums. 19 Some insurers continued to increase
rates through 2003.20 Proponents of tort reform argued that an out-
of-control liability system was causing the sudden and sharp premium
increase.21 Specifically, they maintained that medical malpractice in-
surers had no choice but to increase premiums both because the num-
ber of claims and the size of payments were on the rise, and because
juries were increasingly handing down outrageously large damages
awards.22 They also claimed that the broken liability system regularly
and handsomely rewarded sympathetic plaintiffs who brought frivo-
lous claims.2 3
In 2003, the Texas legislature passed a tort reform package that in-
cluded caps on noneconomic damages in an effort to address the per-
ceived insurance and tort system crisis.24 During the run-up to
passage, supporters claimed that "[c]apping noneconomic damages at
reasonable limits would encourage insurers to do business in Texas by
ensuring that they would not incur massive losses because of large
damage awards. ' 25 Some went further to claim that public resources
were at stake: Texas Senator Robert Deuell argued during floor de-
bate that "[w]hen noneconomic damages are excessive, it's really not
the defendant ... that pays. It's the other people who pay into the
insurance plans."'26 Deuell went on to assert that taxpayers ultimately
pay for excessive awards.27
19. See Black et al., supra note 7, at 224 fig.1.
20. Id.
21. Eric Torbenson & Jason Roberson, Tort Reform: Is This Change Healthy?, DALLAS
MOaNING NEWS, June 17, 2007, at 1A, 14A; Texans for Lawsuit Reform, Texas Urgently Needs
Tort Reform to Avert Further Damage to Healthcare System, http://www.tortreform.com/node/
173 (last visited July 13, 2009).
22. See Torbenson & Roberson, supra note 21, at 14A.
23. See Texans for Lawsuit Reform, supra note 21; Mike Thomas, Op-Ed., Medical Malprac-
tice Needs an Overhaul, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 6, 2009, at B1.
24. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., Focus REPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS PROPOSED
FOR SEPT. 2003 BALLOT, H.R. No. 78-10, at 33. (2003), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
focus/amend78.pdf. In addition to caps on noneconomic damages, the tort reform package in-
cluded other provisions meant to reduce expected liability such as modifications to joint and
several liability rules and the possibility of periodic payments. See Ronen Avraham, Database of
State Law Tort Reforms (DSTLR, 2nd) 116-18 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. 06-08, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902711.
25. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., Focus REPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS PROPOSED
FOR SEPT. 2003 BALLOT, H.R. No. 78-10, at 33 (2003), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
focus/amend78.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Black et al., supra note 7, at 231 fig.4.
20101
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
While rhetoric often takes center stage in tort reform debates, re-
cent compilation and dissemination of comprehensive datasets on
closed medical malpractice insurance claims has allowed us to observe
actual trends in medical malpractice litigation and to get a better han-
dle on the relationship between the liability system and insurance
markets. Empirical analyses of Texas's closed claims data have helped
to evaluate whether trends in the liability system actually justified the
noneconomic damages cap passed in Texas and whether and to what
extent the cap might impact litigation outcomes. The studies suggest
that much of the rhetoric missed the mark.
A. Did Conditions Warrant Caps and Other Reforms?
The Texas closed claims data have been used to test multiple claims
of tort reform proponents. With respect to the number of claims, the
data do not support rhetorical claims that the number of medical mal-
practice claims steeply increased prior to the passage of the statutory
noneconomic damages cap. Instead, the data demonstrate that the
per capita claims rate was stable from 1990 to 2002.28 Whether growth
rates are measured using total number of claims per year, number of
large paid claims, or percentage of claims that resulted in large
payouts, the conclusion is the same: the number of large paid claims
did not increase over time.29 In fact, when we control for changes in
the number of practicing physicians or growth in inflation-adjusted
healthcare spending, we find that the number of large paid claims de-
creased. 30 Both the number of claims with payments of less than
$10,000 and with payments between $10,000 and $25,000 appear stable
over time.31
How about claims related to payment size prior to the passage of
the 2003 damages cap? More specifically, do the data support claims
that payment size was skyrocketing during the late 1990s and early
2000s? Again, the empirical results suggest that these assertions were
greatly exaggerated. Despite the variability and possible increase in
the average damages awards from 1988 to 2002,32 payouts per claim
28. Id.
29. Id. Adjusting for population growth, the number of physicians, and healthcare spending
allows us to control for changes in claims rates due to changes in the number of Texas residents.
Id. It is important to control for changes in these variables because if, for example, we find that
claims rates increased due to a population increase, we would not characterize the claims rate
increase as a crisis. It is something that we would expect.
30. Id. at 231 fig.4, 233 tbl.1.
31. Id. at 234 fig.5.
32. Id. at 249-51.
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were either relatively stable or slightly increased. 33 After controlling
for the increase in healthcare costs, which is a significant component
of amounts paid to injured patients, average payouts were either sta-
ble or declined over time.34 Defense costs per large paid claim in-
creased over the period but did so gradually. 35 In addition, defense
costs comprise only a small fraction of payout dollars.36 As a percent-
age of Texas gross state product, the total cost for all large paid claims
(including inflation-adjusted indemnified amounts and defense costs)
was roughly flat over 1990-2002.37 Thus, the gradual increase in total
costs during the late 1990s is likely explained by a predictable increase
in medical costs, not an out-of-control liability system. 38
These results, taken together, suggest that the data do not support
those who use claims about the state of the medical malpractice liabil-
ity system in Texas in order to justify tort reform. Contrary to the
assertions of tort reform proponents, closed claims data suggest little
connection between the liability system and premium fluctuations. 39
If a broken liability system was not behind the sharp increase in
insurance premiums during the late 1990s and early 2000s, it raises the
question, what was? One possibility is that increases were the unin-
tended consequence of price regulations. Specifically, when Texas
passed its 1995 tort reform package, it also imposed a mandatory in-
surance premium reduction based on expected losses to ensure that
the predicted savings of insurers would be passed on to healthcare
providers.40 Prices declined for three years, reflecting the belief of the
insurers and regulators that tort reform would reduce losses. Sharp
33. Id. at 238 fig.9. Note that while median payouts remained stable from 1996 to 2000, the
mean payout increased from roughly $280,000 to $360,000 (a twenty-nine percent increase). In-
surance premium increases, however, far outpaced this increase. See id. at 224 figi.
34. Id. at 237-41.
35. Id. at 243 fig.11.
36. Id. at 245. Data on zero payout and small payout claims are unavailable; therefore, it is
impossible to estimate the change in total defense costs over time. Black et al., however, cast
doubt on the possibility that defense costs caused the sharp premium increases. Id.
37. Id. at 248 fig.13.
38. Id. at 248.
39. Black et al. note that because data on open claims is unavailable premium increases might
in f-ict be due to an increase in the number of claims or an increase in expected payouts on open
claims. See id. at 210. While the data employed in their study cannot rule out this possibility, the
authors argue that it is unlikely. See id. at 210, 218-19. In any event, this hypothesis will be
testable as open claims close and reports are filed with TDI. In addition, TDI does not collect
data on physician specialty. Therefore, the data cannot be used to study connections between
the liability system and insurance markets for subsets of physicians that are particularly hard hit
by insurance premium increases (e.g., obstetricians). Despite this limitation, the data are useful
for debunking more general rhetorical claims.
40. See TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. § 5.131 (Vernon 2006) (repealed Apr. 1, 2007).
2010]
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price increases, however, began in 1998.41 This observation is consis-
tent with the theory that tort reform did not reduce losses as much as
expected and that insurers were forced to substantially increase rates
(and regulators were forced to honor these rate increase requests) in
order to replenish their reserves that were hit hard by the below-cost
pricing following tort reform.42 Black et al. posit additional alterna-
tive explanations, including contemporaneous shocks to reinsurance
markets and the long-tail nature of medical malpractice claims.43 Ulti-
mately, further study is required to uncover the cause of price in-
creases in Texas.
While data limitations-such as unobservable defense costs and the
lack of information on the impact of the liability system across medi-
cal specialties 44-might hinder our ability to draw definitive conclu-
sions regarding whether the liability system is responsible for the
sharp increase in premiums, empirical studies are helpful in shifting
the debate away from rhetoric and toward reality. Analyses of this
kind can help shift the burden of proof to tort reform proponents by
compelling them to substantiate their claims with evidence. As the
next Section demonstrates, empirical studies can also help determine
whether tort reforms are successful.
B. Have Reforms Met Their Intended Goals?
In debates over whether to reform the liability system in order to
stem the rise of medical malpractice insurance premiums, rhetoric
about the potential impacts of tort reform is as common as rhetoric
about the out-of-control liability system. Proponents of tort reform
often point to evidence produced by industry players with an interest
in the outcome of the debate, suggesting that implementation of dam-
ages caps, limitations on joint and several liability, reform of collateral
source rules, tightening of statutes of limitations, and other reforms
have a substantial impact on medical malpractice insurance
premiums.45
Recent studies, however, have demonstrated fairly convincingly
that tort reforms do not substantially reduce insurance premiums.
41. See Black et al., supra note 7, at 254.
42. See id. I am currently constructing a multistate dataset to investigate this conjecture.
43. Id. at 253-54.
44. Texas does not require reporting of defense costs when small payouts are made. See supra
note 12. It also does not require insurers to report the provider's specialty. See supra note 9.
45. See e.g., Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Facts About Tort Liability and Its Impact on Consumers,
http://www.atra.orglwrap/files.cgi17963_howtortreform.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2009) (provid-
ing information about the costs of the U.S. tort system; figures are from a 2004 report by Tling-
hast, an insurance industry consultancy).
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Empiricists have investigated the impacts of various tort reforms on
claims rates, average payouts, and insurance premiums. The results,
some of which are summarized below, suggest that reforms have little
to no impact on these variables, although the most restrictive damages
caps seem to have some impact. 46
While some evidence suggests that joint and several liability limita-
tions are associated with lower premiums,47 other results suggest that
these limitations do not decrease payouts.48 Although, to my knowl-
edge, we do not have evidence about this reform's impact on the
claims rate, the evidence related to premiums and payouts in Texas is
consistent with the conjecture that, in the absence of an effect of joint
and several liability reform on average payouts, mandatory price de-
creases, passed in conjunction with tort reforms, caused the observed
price decreases.
Findings related to the impacts of statutes of limitations and repose
reforms are also mixed. Some studies suggest that these reforms re-
duce average payouts;49 some suggest they do not.50  Other studies
suggest that these reforms reduce claim frequency;51 some find they
do not.52 Similarly, some studies conclude that these reforms reduce
46. All studies cited in this section use sophisticated methods to estimate effects and control
for alternative explanations.
47. See Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assessing Our
Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND
CONSUMER WELFARE 272, 274-75 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991); Patricia M. Danzon, Andrew J.
Epstein & Scott J. Johnson, The Crisis in Medical Malpractice Insurance, in BROOKINGS-WHAR-
TON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 55, 82 (R. Harris & R. Litan eds. 2004); W. Kip Viscusi et
al., The Effect of 1980s Tort Reform Legislation on General Liability and Medical Malpractice
Insurance, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165, 165 (1993). But see Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical
Malpractice "Crisis": Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH Api. W4-20,
W4-25 to W4-26 (Supp. Web Exclusives Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://content.health
affairs.org/cgi/content/fullhlthaff.w4.20vl/DC1.
48. See Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Mal-
practice Settlement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S183, S206 (2007); Blackmon & Zeckhauser,
supra note 47, at 277; Viscusi et al., supra note 47, at 181-82; Teresa M. Waters et al., Market
Watch: Impact of State Tort Reforms on Physician Malpractice Payments, 26 HEALTH An'. 500,
508 (2007).
49. See Patricia Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L. & ECON.
115, 139 (1984).
50. See Frank A. Sloan, Paula M. Mergenhagen & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Effects of Tort Re-
forms on the Value of Closed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 663, 674 (1989); Stephen Zuckerman, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, Effects
of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INoUIRY 167,
180 (1990); Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 278; Waters et al., supra note 48. at 507.
51. See Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
Evidence, 49 LAW & CoN EM. PROBs. 57, 71 (1986); Zuckerman et al., supra note 47, at 167.
52. See Danzon, supra note 49, at 116.
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premiums,5 3 but others find no association between the reforms and
premiums.54 Further investigation of the impacts of statutes of limita-
tions and repose reform is required in order to more confidently as-
sess how these reforms affect outcomes.
The literature, however, does signal consensus on the impacts of a
number of reforms, including attorney contingency fee limits, collat-
eral source offsets, pretrial screening panels, and periodic payments. 55
The majority of published studies find that these reforms do not de-
crease claim frequency, payment severity, or premiums. The general
rhetoric prevalent in tort reform debates might account for the contin-
ued popularity of these reforms despite the strong evidence that they
do not achieve their intended goals.
The evidence on the effectiveness of damages caps-the most popu-
lar tort reform-is mixed.56 Some analysts find that caps on
noneconomic damages do not significantly lower premiums.5 7 Others
find that states have enjoyed premium reductions when they cap both
economic and noneconomic damages or when they implement rela-
tively restrictive caps. 58 Likewise, some analysts find that caps lead to
small decreases in defensive medicine,5 9 but others find no effect. 60 In
particular, Morrisey et al. find no impact of caps on health insurance
premiums for employer-sponsored insurance, 61 while Avraham and
Schazenbach find (1) a positive association between caps on total
damages and rates of private healthcare coverage for price-sensitive
53. See Zuckerman et al., supra note 50, at 167.
54. See Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 287; Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the
Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 629, 629 (1985).
55. See Michelle Mello, Medical Malpractice: Impact of the Crisis and Effect of State Tort Re-
forms 10 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Research Synthesis Report, 2006), available at
http://www.policysynthesis.org.
56. See id. at 9-11.
57. See BHAT, supra note 6, at 109; Zuckerman et al., supra note 50, at 180.
58. See BHAT, supra note 6, at 101-03; Danzon et al., supra note 47, at 89; Meredith L. Kil-
gore, Michael A. Morrisey & Leonard J. Nelson, Tort Law and Medical Malpractice Insurance
Premiums, 43 INQUIRY 255, 255 (2006); Thorpe, supra note 47, at W4-20; Zuckerman et al., supra
note 50, at 180.
59. See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, How Liability Law Affects Medical Produc-
tivity, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 931, 932 (2002).
60. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4968&sequence=O (find-
ing that reducing tort liability does not reduce medical spending); see also Frank A. Sloan &
John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical Evidence for "Defensive Medicine"? A Reassessment, 28 J.
HEALTH ECON. 481, 481 (2009) (concluding that "tort reforms do not significantly affect medical
decisions").
61. See Michael A. Morrisey, Meredith L. Kilgore & Leonard (Jack) Nelson, Medical Mal-
practice Reform and Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums, 43 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 2124, 2124 (2008).
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buyers, and (2) no association between healthcare coverage and puni-
tive and noneconomic damages caps. 62 In sum, while damages caps
have been found in some cases to achieve their intended goals, albeit
having small impacts on outcomes, much evidence supports the claim
that caps fail to stabilize medical malpractice insurance markets.
Due to the small number of claims closed post-cap, the Texas closed
claims data cannot be used to accurately estimate the impacts of tort
reform. David Hyman and his co-authors, however, used it to esti-
mate the hypothetical impact of the 2003 noneconomic damages cap
on payouts related to claims closed from 1988 to 2004.63 Hyman et al.
first estimate the impact the cap would have had on jury verdicts. 64
They then use this analysis to consider how the cap might have af-
fected settlements. 65 The results comport with prior findings:66 while
caps would have had a substantial impact on damages awards at trial,
the impact on actual payouts would have been much smaller, although
substantial given the restrictive cap of $250,000.67 Most importantly,
their findings provide clues as to why caps might not impact medical
malpractice insurance premiums in predicted ways. Using insights
from previous research that finds that payouts in Texas rarely exceed
the provider's insurance policy limits, Hyman et al. note that damages
caps that exceed average policy limits should not have a substantial
impact.68 Thus, while Hyman and his colleagues' analysis certainly
cannot provide a completely accurate picture of how the cap would
have impacted outcomes (because, for example, some claims would
not have been brought at all had caps been imposed), 69 it does help
explain, at least in part, why caps might not impact payouts and pre-
miums in predicted ways.
62. See Ronen Avraham & Max M. Schanzenbach, Impact of Tort Reform on Private Health
Insurance Coverage (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 07-
16, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=995270.
63. Hyman et al., Evidence from Texas, supra note 8, at 355.
64. Id. at 364-65.
65. Id. at 370-72.
66. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
67. Hyman et al., Evidence from Texas, supra note 8, at 405 ("We find that this cap will have
economically significant effects. For tried cases, holding case mix constant, the cap will reduce
allowed noneconomic damages by an estimated 73%, allowed verdicts by 38%, and payouts by
27-percent. In settled cases, the estimated decline in payouts is 18%.").
68. See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of policy limits on
payouts).
69. In addition, the authors made a number of assumptions about how caps impact damages
awards because they lacked important information such as the portion of economic damages
attributed to medical expenses, to which the death cap does not apply. See Hyman et al., Evi-
dence from Texas, supra note 8, at 366.
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Empirical studies have not only demonstrated the general ineffec-
tiveness of tort reform, but they have also exposed some potentially
harmful impacts that tort reforms can have on subsets of the injured
patient population. Using Texas closed claims data, Hyman et al. pre-
dict a disparate impact across plaintiff groups, with the deceased, un-
employed, and (likely) elderly plaintiffs enduring much larger
reductions in recoveries than other plaintiffs.70 Mello reports results
that demonstrate a similar effect for the most severely injured plain-
tiffs. 71 The literature addressing this question is thin, however; more
research is needed in order to better understand whether and how
caps impact outcomes across various subsets of claimants. It should
be noted, however, that relatively low recoveries are not the sole con-
cern. Analysts must also consider the difficulty these types of patients
will have in finding lawyers who are willing to represent them pursu-
ant to contingency fee arrangements. This impact is difficult to esti-
mate, but it remains an important part of the big picture.
Recent sophisticated empirical studies that examine the impacts of
tort reform on the liability system and insurance markets make it diffi-
cult for proponents of tort reforms to claim that traditional reforms,
such as damages caps, will substantially quell rising insurance premi-
ums without reducing the neediest claimants' ability to recover. Data
have certainly allowed more objective assessments of the trade-offs
we face in exchange for potential marginal benefits obtained from im-
plementing the most effective tort reforms.
III. DRAWING INFERENCES FROM LARGE VERDICr AWARDS
In addition to rhetoric on the connection between the liability sys-
tem and insurance markets, tort reform debates are also often influ-
enced by unsubstantiated claims related to trends in medical
malpractice jury verdicts and how these verdicts impact eventual in-
surer payouts and premiums. Proponents of tort reform argue that
out-of-control juries hold healthcare providers liable for medical mal-
practice more often than they should 72 and that juries have been
awarding plaintiffs increasingly large amounts of damages, which
70. See id. at 381-82.
71. See Mello, supra note 55, at 13.
72. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Bush Campaigns to Curb Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at A6.
Bush surrounded himself with doctors in white coats to argue that "junk lawsuits" were
driving physicians out of places such as Collinsville, ranked by advocates as the friendli-
est place in the United States for trial lawyers chasing big awards. "You see firsthand
what happens when the system gets out of control," he told a crowd of supporters.
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forces insurers to either substantially increase premiums or exit the
market.73
A recent empirical study by David Studdert and others provides
one of the first assessments of tort reform proponents' claims that
medical liability system error rates are excessively high.74 They find
that error rates are lower than tort reform proponents often claim.7
5
In roughly 73% of claims in which physicians concluded that medical
error caused the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff received compensation.
In addition, in roughly 72% of claims in which no medical error was
found, plaintiffs received no compensation. 76 The authors also find
that payment size is positively correlated with whether a medical error
occurred. 77 These findings suggest that the liability system's error
rate, while substantial and cause for concern, is not as high as some
have claimed.78
Recent empirical findings also allow us to assess claims about trends
in Texas medical malpractice verdicts and how verdicts impact payouts
and premiums. Section A summarizes recent findings, which suggest
that despite an increase in Texas medical malpractice jury awards,
payouts have remained stable over time.79 Section B describes evi-
dence that might help explain this counterintuitive finding. The evi-
dence suggests that insurance policy limits tend to limit payouts
regardless of verdict size. Patients rarely recover more than the pro-
vider's policy limit, even when juries award large verdicts.80 Finally,
Section C presents findings that are consistent with the claim that
Texas physicians are strategically decreasing their insurance coverage,
73. See, e.g., James Dao, A Push in States to Curb Malpractice Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005,
at A21 ("[M]any insurance companies had stopped issuing policies, reducing competition and
causing premiums to rise."); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Rejects Award Limits in Malpractice,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at A25 ("Mr. Frist and other supporters of revamping malpractice law,
including the American Medical Association, have argued for years that rising insurance rates,
fueled by skyrocketing jury awards, are driving doctors out of business and compromising pa-
tient care.").
74. See David Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Mal-
practice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2024 (2006).
75. Id. at 2031.
76. Id. at 2027-28.
77. Id. at 2024.
78. Id. at 2031 ("[P]ortraits of a malpractice system that is stricken with frivolous litigation are
overblown."). It is important to note that physicians who reviewed the medical records associ-
ated with these cases had access to the litigation outcome, which might have influenced their
medical error determinations. See id. at 2031-32 (cautioning the reader about several limitations
of the study). Additional research is required to confirm conclusions drawn from the study
about the liability system error rate.
79. See discussion infra Part III.A.
80. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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which might further reduce payments that injured patients receive.81
While additional research is necessary to more fully understand the
relationship between the liability system and insurance markets, the
current evidence suggests that Texas might be experiencing a patient
compensation crisis, rather than a medical malpractice liability crisis.
A. Verdicts v. Payouts
Tort reform proponents often point to large verdict awards as evi-
dence of a broken medical malpractice liability system. They argue
that unjustified blockbuster awards encourage plaintiff attorneys, who
typically work on a contingency fee basis, to play the "lawsuit lot-
tery. '82 In addition, they claim that awards impact not only claims
rates, but also settlement behavior of claimants and insurers. Fear of
out-of-control juries, the argument goes, compels insurers to settle
even nonmeritorious claims with large payments.
Using verdicts to predict settlement behavior, however, might lead
to substantial errors if payouts and verdicts tend to diverge. Payouts
can be lower than verdicts for several reasons: (1) adjustments made
through remittitur, (2) appellate court reversals, (3) imposition of stat-
utory damages caps, and (4) post-verdict settlement negotiations.
Conversely, we expect payouts to exceed verdicts in some cases, such
as when plaintiffs accept payments in exchange for foregoing the ap-
peal of pro-defendant verdicts. Therefore, data on verdicts might lead
to false impressions about the amount of money that changes hands.
Actual payments have been notoriously difficult to estimate, given the
lack of available data on settlements.
My co-authors and I used the Texas data on claims closed from 1988
to 2003 to estimate differences between verdicts and payouts. 83 We
find that payouts fall far short of verdicts in the vast majority of "large
claim" cases-cases with total payouts of at least $25,000 in 1988 dol-
lars. 84 While jury verdicts and payouts are positively correlated, 75%
of post-verdict payments were lower than the adjusted verdict, which
is defined as jury award plus pre- and post-judgment interest. 85 An
analysis of 306 verdicts handed down in large claim cases closed from
81. See discussion infra Part III.C.
82. See generally JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTIrERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN
(1979).
83. See Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 3. Of 13,269 incidents of alleged malpractice that re-
sulted in payouts of at least $25,000 (in 1988 dollars), 690 (5.1%) went to trial and 315 (2.7%)
resulted in a verdict. Id. at 16 tbl.2. Fifteen cases that involved bench trials were excluded from
the analysis. Id.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 5. Five percent of payouts following verdicts exceeded adjusted verdicts. Id. at 6.
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1988 to 2003 revealed that plaintiffs received only 56% of total ad-
justed verdicts ($212 million total payouts following adjusted verdicts
totaling $482 million). 86 The mean per-case "haircut" was 29% of the
adjusted verdict, and the median was 19%. 87
In addition, the study finds that haircuts and adjusted verdicts are
positively correlated. Forty-seven percent of plaintiffs who were
awarded adjusted verdicts of less than $100,000 experienced an aver-
age haircut of 8% per case.88 In contrast, ninety-eight percent of
plaintiffs who were awarded adjusted verdicts in excess of $2.5 million
experienced an average haircut of 56%.89 As the adjusted verdict in-
creases, both the percentage of cases taking a haircut and the average
per-case haircut increase.90 These findings underscore the difficulties
inherent in justifying tort reform by pointing to verdicts, often widely
reported by the press, and ignoring eventual payouts, which the press
almost never reports.
While accounting for the differences between verdicts and payouts
is important, understanding why these differences occur will better
our understanding of the tort system's inner workings. The following
Section summarizes findings that illuminate the various factors that
drive the verdict-payout discrepancy.
B. Explaining the Discrepancy
Remittitur, appellate court reversals, imposition of damages caps,
and post-verdict settlement negotiations account for a portion of the
$270 million that Texas plaintiffs were awarded from 1988 to 2003 but
never received. 9' The data TDI collects allow us to estimate the im-
pact of various mechanisms that aim to limit post-verdict payments.
Judicial oversight in the form of remittitur, judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict (JNOV), and appellate reversals had a small direct im-
pact on haircuts. 92 Judges reduced verdicts through remittitur in
roughly 5% of cases, for a total reduction of approximately $9 million
(3.3% of the total haircut).93 JNOV and appellate reversals also ac-
86. Id. at 25.
87. Id. See id. at 14, for details on how pre- and post-judgment interest were computed.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 32 tbl.10.
91. Id. at 4-6.
92. Id. at 6. It should be noted that judicial oversight might indirectly impact post-verdict
settlement negotiations. This indirect impact is impossible to measure; therefore, we likely un-
derestimate the influence of judicial oversight on haircuts.
93. Id. at 35. If reversed remittiturs are excluded, the total reduction is approximately $5.5
million (2% of the total haircut). Id.
2010]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
count for a small portion of the total haircut in large payout claims-
roughly $2.5 million of the $270 million total haircut (about 1% of the
total haircut). 94
During the period we studied, legislators required Texas courts to
impose statutory caps on punitive damages and damages awarded in
death cases. 95 The punitive damages cap reduced damages awards in
5 of the 22 cases in which punitive damages were awarded. 96 The total
reduction was roughly $44 million, which amounts to 62% of the
awarded punitive damages and 16% of the total haircut. A cap on
recovery in wrongful death cases applied in 66 cases.97 The cap does
not apply to medical expenses, and TDI does not report these ex-
penses separately; thus, the impact of this cap is a rough estimate.98
At most, however, we estimated that the wrongful death cap ac-
counted for roughly $38 million of the $270 million total haircut
(roughly 14% of the total haircut). Therefore, together, statutory caps
accounted for approximately 30% of the total haircut. This estimate,
plus the estimated impact of judicial oversight, leaves roughly two-
thirds of the total haircut to be explained.
It turns out that the largest portion of the total haircut is due to the
fact that plaintiffs rarely collect more than the provider's insurance
policy limit, even when the adjusted verdict greatly exceeds the policy
limit.99 Figure 1 displays payout-to-policy-limit ratios for single-payer
cases in which the policy limit was at least as large as the adjusted
verdict and cases in which the adjusted verdict exceeded the policy
limit ("above-limits cases"). 100 For cases in which the payout-to-pol-
icy-limit ratio was 100%, the payout was exactly equal to the policy
limit. As Figure 1 reflects, 31% (24 out of 77) of above-limits single-
payer cases had payouts between 95% and 105% of policy limits. A
majority (53%) of above-limits cases settled at or below policy limits,
with the limits effectively capping recovery. 10' Depending on the as-
94. Id. at 36.
95. See id. at 12-13, for a description of the caps.
96. Id. at 36-37.
97. Id. at 38.
98. Id. We assumed that none of the economic damages were for medical expenses; therefore,
we overestimated the impact of the wrongful death cap.
99. Id. at 39-47.
100. We included only single-payer cases in this analysis because we do not have full informa-
tion about excess coverage in multi-payer cases. Of the 315 cases that went to verdict, 214 were
single-payer cases with sufficient information on policy limits to analyze the impact of limits on
payouts. Id. at 39. Caution should be used when drawing inferences from single-payer cases,
however. For example, payouts related to single-payer cases are smaller than those for multi-
payer cases. Id. at 15.
101. Id. at 41.
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sumptions adopted to estimate the impact of policy limits on recov-
eries, policy limits account for 73% to 87% of total haircuts in single-
payer cases. 10 2 For this subset of cases, judicial oversight and caps
explain only 1.5% to 15% of the total haircut, depending on estima-
tion assumptions. 10 3
FIGURE 1: THE IMPACT OF LIMITS ON PAYOUTS10 4
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In a separate study, we analyzed the impact of policy limits on
payouts in all claims against physicians with payouts of at least $25,000
in 1988 dollars, including those that settle prior to verdict.1°5 We find
that policy limits act as de facto caps in these cases as well; only 1.5%
of large payout claims had above-limit payments.1°6 Interestingly, pri-
mary carriers funded most of these payments. 107 Physicians made out-
of-pocket payments in only 62% of the 9,525 cases that closed from
102. Id. at 46. One estimate assumes that caps and remittiturs are applied first and then policy
limits bind the payment. The other assumes policy limits bind the payment before caps and
remittiturs have an impact.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 42 fig.6.
105. Zeiler et al., supra note 8, at S9.
t06. Id. at S11.
107. Id. While we did not explore the reasons why insurers pay amounts above the limits, we
conjecture that insurers make payments in some cases to avoid bad faith settlement claims by
providers who wish to settle when the insurer wishes to defend the provider against the claim.
Id. at S31.
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1990 to 2003.108 In addition, although we might expect more out-of-
pocket payments in cases in which policy limits are low, we find that
low policy limits did not trigger a flood of out-of-pocket payments by
physicians. 0 9 Physicians with $250,000 per occurrence policies made
an out-of-pocket payment in only 32 of 2,488 claims (1.3%).110
While additional unobservable factors, such as high-low agree-
ments, likely explain a portion of the total haircut, post-judgment set-
tlements clearly play a substantial role in reducing payments to
plaintiffs, even when the plaintiffs win large verdicts. This alone is
cause for concern, given the primary goals of the tort system: to com-
pensate negligently injured patients for their losses and to deter negli-
gence. Concern might extend beyond this, however, if we consider
how physicians might react as they learn that they face limited per-
sonal exposure even when injured patients might perceive them as be-
ing underinsured.
Although we do not fully understand why policy limits act as de
facto caps on recoveries,"' the Texas closed claim data provide some
insights into coverage trends.112 The following Section discusses the
findings associated with policies purchased by Texas physicians who
were involved in large paid claims.
C. Trends in Medical Malpractice Coverage and
Implications for Tort Recoveries
The conventional wisdom seems to be that physicians hold medical
malpractice insurance policies with $1 million per-occurrence limits.1 13
The Texas closed claims data suggest otherwise, at least for policies
that covered large paid claims closed from 1990 to 2003. The median
policy limit for the subset of policies covering these claims was
$500,000 in nominal dollars.114 Only 31% of policies in the sample
108. Id. at S26.
109. Id. at S27.
110. Id.
111. Id. at S39.
112. Id. at $32-$34.
113. See, e.g., Frederick W. Cheney, How Much Professional Liability Coverage Is Enough?
Lessons from the ASA Closed Claims Project, AM. Soc'Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS NEWSLETTER,
June 1999, http://www.asahq.org/Newsletters/1999/06_991HowO699.html (examining the "con-
ventional wisdom" that physicians purchase insurance with $1 million per-occurrence limits and
$3 million total annual limits); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, MEDICAL
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 7 (2004), http://www.acep.orgINR/rdonlyres/DD94E243-
339F-4A02-983D-7563D42BCE74/ 0/ MPLIpaperAprilO4.pdf (claiming that "[miost policies pro-
vide $1 million for each incident with a maximum of $3 million per policy period").
114. Zeiler et al., supra note 8, at S32.
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had limits of $1 million.1 5 Six percent had limits of more than $1
million, and 32% had limits of $200,000 or less.116
Insurers in Texas are required to report the year in which a physi-
cian purchased the policy that covered the paid claim.t1 7 These data
allow us to estimate time trends in physician purchasing habits for pol-
icies covering large paid claims. Sample sizes for purchase years
1988-1999 were sufficient to estimate average limits. Figure 2 displays
time trends in policy size by purchase year for perinatal and nonper-
inatal physicians. 118 Real mean and medium limits on policies pur-
chased by both perinatal and nonperinatal physicians who were later
involved in large paid claims fell by roughly 30% from 1988 to 1999.119
FIGURE 2: PERINATAL AND NONPERINATAL PHYSICIAN
POLICY SIZE BY PURCHASE YEAR
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Although our study did not investigate what might be driving the
decline in real coverage, we offer a few conjectures. 121 One theory,
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 9.
118. While TDI does not require insurers to report the specialty of the physician against
whom a claim is made, it does require reporting of the patient's age. We characterize all claims
for injury to patients aged one month or younger at the time of the injury as perinatal claims.
This allows us to estimate trends for a group of physicians thought to be hardest hit by the out-
of-control liability system. See Zeiler et al., supra note 8, at S18.
119. Id. at $33-S34. Declines over time were statistically significant at the 1% significance
level. Id.
120. Id. at S34 fig.9. Policies relate to single-payer cases resolved with a payment of at least
$25,000 in 1988 dollars.
121. Id. at S38-39.
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consistent with observed trends, suggests that physicians purchase
smaller and cheaper policies after realizing that exposure is minute
even when coverage is low. 122 While most managed care organiza-
tions and hospitals require their physicians to hold liability insurance,
physicians are likely able to influence decisions over required cover-
age levels. Whether declining coverage is explained by something as
simple as an increase in premiums or relatively cheap alternatives-
e.g., asset protection strategies-or by a more complex story of strate-
gic behavior on the part of providers, declining coverage reduces pay-
ments under the liability system. This, in turn, might limit the ability
of the system to deliver just outcomes for injured patients.
IV. CONCLUSION
These findings, together with other published findings, help us eval-
uate whether and how well the medical malpractice liability system
meets its primary goals: just compensation and deterrence. Contrary
to the common rhetoric heard during tort reform debates, evidence
suggests that the connection between the liability system and insur-
ance markets is tenuous, which makes it unsurprising that tort reform
has little to no impact on insurance markets. In addition, Texas closed
claims data suggest that large jury awards, which get ample press, are
often followed by much smaller payouts, a fact almost never accompa-
nying news of jumbo verdicts. A large portion of the difference is
attributable to the finding that patients rarely receive more than the
provider's policy limits. This, coupled with the fact that Texas physi-
cians are purchasing less real coverage over time, suggests that we
might be facing a patient compensation crisis rather than a medical
malpractice liability crisis.
While the data collected by the TDI have proven extremely useful
for establishing a set of facts from which debates about how best to
handle crises can begin, data on closed medical malpractice claims are
rare. Either the data are not collected or they are collected but not
made publicly available. 123 Academic researchers have a substantial
122. Id.
123. Florida and Missouri collect similar datasets and make them publicly available. Michigan
collects closed claims data, but they are available only in paper form. Illinois, New York, Minne-
sota, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Washington collect closed claims data but do not allow the
public access to them. Most states do not collect such data. The National Practitioner Data
Bank (NPDB) also collects and allows public access to data on paid medical malpractice claims,
although the data are not audited for completeness and accuracy. See Lawrence E. Smarr, A
Comparative Assessment of the PIAA Data Sharing Project and the National Practitioner Data
Bank: Policy, Purpose, and Application, 60 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 59, 59 (1997); Joseph T.
Hallinan, Attempt to Track Malpractice Cases Is Often Thwarted, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2004, at 1.
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role to play in helping to increase the volume of available data, to
establish factual baselines, and to study important yet unresolved
questions. Involvement comes in many forms, including generating
datasets from legal rules, 2 4 gathering data from market players,125
and collaborating with organizations that work to increase the volume
of available data that can be used to fashion more efficacious policy.
To this end, I and others have been working with the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners to draft a model law that re-
quires state departments of insurance to collect medical malpractice
closed claims data from insurance companies and self-insured market
actors. 126 The hope is that a substantial number of states will adopt
the model law and that uniform multi-state data will be available to
the public. Multi-state data would allow for a more sophisticated
analysis of the causes of medical malpractice insurance crises (assum-
ing they exist), the causes of medical error, and the impacts of tort
reform on premiums, payments, and claims rates, just to name a few.
Involvement by academics can mitigate, at least to some extent, the
influence of industry actors who have strong incentives to keep the
data private.
It should be noted that we do not know much about the general-
izability of the results reported in the Texas studies. This is cause for
concern as the state may differ in important ways from other states
that experience severe fluctuations in medical malpractice insurance
premiums. 127 In addition, all empirical studies are inherently limited
due to missing observations, limited time periods, and other data im-
perfections. Studies produced using the Texas data, however, demon-
Despite these shortcomings, some have used the NPDB data to analyze medical malpractice
liability trends. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 48, at S183.
124. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 24, at 116-18 (constructing dataset of tort reforms passed
by state and by year, including results of judicial determinations of constitutional challenges to
reforms).
125. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in
Action, 35 LAW & Soc. REV. 275 (2001) (employing qualitative data gathered from interviews of
practicing medical malpractice attorneys to study why physicians tend not to pay out of their
own pockets on claims with payments in excess of the policy limits); Albert Yoon, Damage Caps
and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM.
LAW & ECON. REV. 199, 202 (2001) (using data obtained from a medical malpractice insurer to
study the impacts of damage caps on payment severity).
126. A draft of the model law, guidelines for companion regulations, and opinion letters from
interested parties-including physician groups, insurance companies, and academics-are availa-
ble at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees c-sitf_080221_MedMal-SITF_Request.
closed-claimireporting-model-law.pdf.
127. For example, Texas has one of the nation's largest homestead exemptions, which might
make it relatively easy for doctors to protect at least some of their assets from attachment. See
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50, 51 (protecting homes from forced sale for the payment of most
debts).
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strate the value of observation in understanding whether the liability
system enhances or limits civil justice for injured patients. Policy mak-
ers are more likely to implement effective solutions if debates stand
on firm foundations that are established by facts rather than rhetoric.
